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Abstract: This article examines strategic public shaming, a novel form of regulatory tactics 
employed by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) during its 
enforcement of the Anti-Monopoly Law.  Based on analysis of media coverage and interview 
findings, the study finds that the way that the NDRC disclosed its investigation is highly 
strategic depending on the firm’s co-operative attitude toward the investigation.  Event studies 
further show that the NDRC’s proactive disclosure resulted in significantly negative abnormal 
returns of the stock prices of firms subject to the disclosure.  For instance, Biostime, an infant-
formula manufacturer investigated in 2013, experienced -22% cumulative abnormal return in 
a three-day event window, resulting in a loss of market capitalization that is 27 times the 
ultimate antitrust fine that it received.  The NDRC’s strategic public shaming could therefore 
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On 9 November 2011, the antitrust bureau of the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC), formally known as the Anti-Monopoly and Price Supervision Bureau, 
made a surprise announcement on the China Central Television (CCTV). The NDRC’s 
representative disclosed that the agency had been investigating two large telecommunication 
firms—China Telecom and China Unicom—for allegedly conducting price discrimination 
against rival companies (China Telecom and China Unicom Case). 1   This announcement 
caused a sensation in China and triggered a public debate in the Chinese media about the 
regulation of these state-owned enterprises (SOEs).  But the NDRC’s high-profile televised 
announcement stands in sharp contrast to its practice in other investigations, where the agency 
has kept its investigations quite low-key.  Indeed, on a few occasions, the agency announced 
its decision directly, without any prior disclosure, and in a few cases, the agency even 
concealed its decision.  So what is the explanation for the NDRC’s varied disclosure practice, 
and what’s the impact on the firms’ market value?  Based on analysis of media coverage and 
interview findings, I find that the NDRC has employed strategic public shaming, a novel form 
of regulatory tactics—If a firm does not co-operate and quickly yield to the agency’s demand, 
the NDRC could act as a whistle blower and proactively leak such information to leading party 
media outlets, which exposes the firm to a high level of negative publicity and can adversely 
influence their stock performance.  This exerts pressure on firms to conform and deter them 
from defying its orders.   
 
Chinese antitrust enforcement presents us with an ideal setting in which to observe the transient 
stage when a newly created administrative agency tries to quickly establish its legal authority 
by strategically leveraging shaming sanctions.  China only began to enforce the Anti-Monopoly 
Law (AML) in 2008.  As there were very few precedents available during the first few years 
of its enforcement, businesses were just starting to learn about the impact of the legal sanctions 
under the AML.  For the same reason, businesses had not fully understood the impact of a 
market sanction as a consequence of a regulator’s high-profile media announcement.  As the 
NDRC’s pattern of enforcement was not well-established at that time, businesses were not so 
deterred by the sanction under the AML.  Thus, the first few cases in which the NDRC applied 
shaming sanctions set important precedents for subsequent cases, and they become the focal 
points for compliance for businesses and practitioners.   
 
The study is related to several strands of literature.  Previous research on the market reactions 
to antitrust investigations has identified negative abnormal returns, though the magnitude is 
much less than those in financial misconduct cases.2  This study is the first to estimate the 
impact of the announcement of the antitrust investigation on the stock prices of firms subject 
to investigation in China.  Moreover, the fact that the Chinese antitrust agencies would 
strategically utilize the state media to make a public announcement of their antitrust 
investigations is a unique phenomenon that has not been observed in any other major antitrust 
jurisdictions.  While public disclosure of an antitrust investigation is routine for enforcement 
agencies in other jurisdictions, the Chinese antitrust enforcement agencies employ it 
strategically as a mechanism for reputation sanction.   
 
                                                 
1 CCTV 2011.  
 
2  Bosch and Eckard, 1991; Aguzzoni, Langus and Motta, 2007; Broek, Kemp, Verschoor and De Vries, 2012, 
231-258; Günster and Dijk 2016, 20-33. 
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This study also contributes to the literature on the use of shaming sanctions in China.  Scholars 
observed that Chinese administrative agencies have applied shaming tactics in a wide range of 
administrative enforcement, including securities law,3 environmental law,4 and intellectual 
property law. 5   Similar to these studies, this article provides another concrete and 
contextualized example of how Chinese government agencies utilize the reputational 
mechanism to achieve their policy objectives.   However, the strategic use of such shaming 
sanctions has not yet been studied.  In earlier literature, a reputation sanction is imposed 
independently of a firm’s response to the regulatory action.  Because the damage would occur 
anyway, the sanction shouldn’t affect a firm’s incentive to challenge the regulatory act.  In the 
context of Chinese antitrust, public shaming takes place before the agency formally imposes a 
legal sanction and the imposition of such a shaming sanction is conditional on the firm’s 
cooperative attitude.  
 
Lastly, this research contributes to the institutionally oriented studies on Chinese antitrust law. 
Zhang has identified how extralegal factors such as bureaucratic politics play an important role 
in driving the enforcement outcome in Chinese antitrust.6  In this article, I found that the NDRC 
can strategically utilize shaming sanctions to exert pressures on firms to cooperate with the 
agency.  This innovative form of regulation helps the NDRC overcome the poor governance 
institutions in China in order to propel active antitrust enforcement in China. Meanwhile, the 
findings in this article refute the long-standing belief that the AML is solely targeted at foreign 
firms and will never be seriously applied to its SOEs.  The utility function of the Chinese 
government is highly complex and it is misleading to attribute its motivation to enforce the 
AML as solely driven by protectionist ground.  
 
While this study focuses on the stock market reactions in response to the NDRC’s strategic 
shaming sanction, it is worth noting that share prices may be reacting to a broad range of 
consequences for the firms.  Thus, there is a potential opportunity to further analyze and 
disaggregate the regulatory effects from the reputational effects.  However, due to the length 
limitation, I leave this question for future inquiry. Similarly, an analytical study of the 




I. Pattern of Disclosure 
In China, the responsibility to enforce the AML is shared among three administrative agencies. 
In particular, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) is primarily responsible for merger 
control, whereas the NDRC and the State Administration for Industry and Commission (SAIC) 
concurrently share the responsibility of enforcing against anti-competitive conduct. More 
specifically, the NDRC is in charge of enforcing against price-related anti-competitive conduct, 
whereas the SAIC is in charge of enforcing against non-price-related anti-competitive conduct.  
This article focuses on the behaviour of the NDRC, for two reasons: first, the NDRC is the 
only agency among the three main ones that has proactively employed a media strategy during 
                                                 
3 Liebman and Milhaupt 2008. 
 
4 Shapiro 2017, 52.  
 
5 Yu 2006, 952-955. 
 
6  Zhang, Angela 2014, 671, 684; Zhang, Angela 2015, 195. 
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its enforcement.  While the other two agencies also routinely disclose their enforcement 
activities, neither of them have been seen to adopt strategic shaming sanctions (i.e., proactively 
announcing the investigations on the leading party media outlets).   Second, the NDRC has 
made constant headlines at home and abroad by bringing actions against prominent domestic 
and foreign targets in recent years, and its hectic enforcement allows us to identify a pattern of 
disclosure and examine the impact of public shaming.   
 
According to the AML, antitrust enforcement agencies can publicly disclose their decisions 
after their investigations. 7  However, for non-merger decisions,  the law did not make it 
mandatory for agencies to disclose their decisions, nor did it obligate the agencies to disclose 
their investigations before releasing their decisions.  Thus, the lack of detail in the AML leaves 
significant discretion in the hands of the agencies in deciding whether, when, and how to 
disclose their investigations.  Even after a decision is imposed, they have the discretion not to 
make it public.  To investigate the pattern of disclosure by the NDRC, I collected all the 
antitrust cases that were investigated by the NDRC from the inception of the enforcement of 
the AML until the end of 2015.  I included only closed cases, excluding those that were still 
pending.  This is because there was often no public disclosure of a case until the decision was 
announced, as explained below.  As the purpose of this study is to investigate the stock 
reactions of the firm subject to disclosure, I exclude those cases that do not involve publicly 
listed companies.  This leaves me with a sample of ten antitrust investigations involving 95 
companies.   
 
Several features of the cases in the sample are noteworthy. First, all these cases were brought 
during the period of 2011 to 2015 because the NDRC was preoccupied with capacity building 
in the first three years after the enactment of the AML and needed to gather the momentum to 
bring large investigations.  Second, these cases are the most visible cases brought by the NDRC 
during that period due to the prominence of the targets involved and the harsh penalties 
imposed by the NDRC.  Notably, the SAIC, the other major antitrust enforcement agency, had 
only initiated two large antitrust investigations by the end of 2015.  Thus, the first few cases 
that the NDRC brought set important precedents for subsequent enforcements of the AML.  
Third, all these cases were brought during the tenure of Xu Kunlin 许 许 许 , who served as the 
Director General of the antitrust bureau from December 2009 to February 2015.  Xu, a veteran 
in charge of price monitoring and supervision in China, is a highly ambitious and resourceful 
technocrat.8 After the conclusion of the Qualcomm case, Xu was quickly promoted to other 
departments within the NDRC.  Interviewees note that Xu is adept at using the media to help 
push forward a case when the investigation reaches a stalemate.9  
 
To examine how the NDRC disclosed its investigations in these cases, I conducted an 
exhaustive search of public disclosures of the NDRC’s investigations using two Chinese-
language databases.  The first is WiseNews, a leading provider of general Chinese news 
database.  WiseNews collects news reports from 110 general-interest Chinese newspapers 
published in mainland China.  To complement the search results obtained from WiseNews, I 
                                                 
7 The Anti-Monopoly Law, Art. 44.  
 
8 Martina, Michael and Miller, Matthew 2014. “‘Mr. Confession’ and His Boss Drive China’s Antitrust Crusade,
” Reuters, 15 September, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-antitrust-ndrc-insight-
idUSKBN0HA27X20140915. Accessed 20 March 2017. 
 
9 Interview with BJ01, BJ02, BJ03, BJ04, NDRC officials, Beijing, May-June 2016.  
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conducted the same search for each case using Baidu, the largest Chinese-language search 
engine.  This allows me to identify the first time that the media covered the NDRC’s 
investigation and the first player that made such a disclosure.  I supplemented the analysis of 
the media reports with interviews that I conducted over the past few years with NDRC officials, 
legal scholars, and lawyers who worked on some of these cases.  The interviews that I 
conducted are open-ended, with some over the phone and some face-to-face in China.  Given 
the sensitive nature of the topic, all these interviews were conducted anonymously.  Table 1 
below summarizes the NDRC’s disclosure pattern during its antitrust investigations.  
 
 





Proactive Public Announcement on State 
Media 
 
China Telecom/China Unicom 




Reactive Disclosure After 
Firms’ Self-Disclosure 
 
InterDigital Case, Qualcomm Case, 
Auto Part Cases 
Disclosure Without Naming 
Individual Firms Involved 
 
Japanese Auto Cartel 
No Prior Disclosure and 
Announcing the Decision 
Directly 
Eye Vision Cases, White Liquor 
Cases  
No Prior Disclosure and Long 
Delay in Announcing the 
Decision  
Zhejiang Insurance Case 
No Public Disclosure of 
Either Investigation or 
Decision 
Some Chinese SOEs Cases  
Source: various news articles obtained from WiseNews and Baidu 
 
i. Passive Disclosure 
In the majority of cases, the NDRC adopted a passive approach in disclosing its investigations.  
For instance, it revealed its investigations after firms’ self-disclosures in two abuse of 
dominance cases involving InterDigital (InterDigital Case) and Qualcomm (Qualcomm Case), 
as well as a resale price maintenance case involving a number of luxury-car manufacturers and 
their dealers (Auto Part Cases).  In a cartel case involving 12 Japanese auto companies 
(Japanese Auto Cartel), the NDRC disclosed its investigations prior to the firms’ self-
disclosures, but did not specify the names of the individual companies involved.  In two resale 
price maintenance cases, one involving Maotai and Wuliangye (White Liquor Case) and the 
other involving premium optical manufacturers (Vision Care Case), the NDRC announced its 
decisions directly without any prior disclosure of its investigations.  In both cases, companies 
were seen to have actively co-operated with the NDRC’s investigations and agreed to rectify 
their behaviour before the NDRC announced its decisions. Notably, the decision of Maotai 
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only appeared on Guizhou DRC’s website briefly and was then quickly removed overnight.  
NDRC officials noted that because Maotai is a local state-owned champion, local officials 
faced significant pressures to announce this case.10  In one case, the NDRC delayed announcing 
the decision until months after the case was completed.  On 2 September 2014, the NDRC 
announced that it had imposed a fine of approximately RMB 110 million on a number of 
insurance companies and an insurance association (Zhejiang Insurance Case). 11  However, the 
decision had in fact been made more than nine months earlier.   
 
A few insiders indicated that the NDRC had investigated many more cases than those that it 
disclosed in public.12  For instance, in April 2009, several media outlets reported that five large 
domestic state-owned airline companies were suspected of fixing the prices of airfares.13  The 
NDRC never made any announcement about any related investigation.  But acute observers 
found that this case was briefly mentioned in an obscure Chinese magazine entitled Price 
Supervision and Check (Jiage Jiandu Yu Jiancha 许 许 许 许 许 许 许  ). 14  The magazine is not 
widely circulated and is mostly read by government officials responsible for price monitoring 
and control.  According to the reports in the magazine, the NDRC representatives investigated 
these domestic airlines and requested rectification of their conduct in August 2009.15  It further 
disclosed that the NDRC submitted a report of its investigation to the State Council, which was 
subsequently reviewed by the then Vice Premier Li Keqiang. 16  According to an NDRC official, 
no public sanction was imposed on these airlines because the case was “harmonized”, i.e., 
resolved inside the bureaucracy.17  Such a phenomenon of “internal dispute resolution” is not 
uncommon.  A scholar’s close examination of the reports published in Price Supervision and 
Check between 2009 and 2013 revealed more mysterious omission by the NDRC of its antitrust 
investigations.18  These cases involved a wide range of domestic targets, including regional 
monopolies and large central SOEs.  As later acknowledged by Xu Kunlin during a TV 
interview, the NDRC had kept a low profile of many cases that it had investigated out of 
                                                 
10 Interview with BJ04, an NDRC official, Beijing, June 2016.  
 
11 NDRC 2014. “Zhejiang Baoxian Hangye Weifan Fanlongduan Fa Beichu 1.1yiyuan Fakuan,” (The Insurance 
Industry Were Fined RMB110 Million by NDRC for Antitrust Violations), 2 Sep., 
http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fzgggz/jgjdyfld/jjszhdt/201409/t20140902_624514.html.  Accessed 20 March 2017 
 
12 Interview with BJ01, BJ02, BJ03, BJ04, four NDRC officials, June 2016; phone interview with a Chinese 
antitrust scholar, Dec. 2013.    
 
13 Travel Daily. 2009. “Hangkong Gongsi Lianshou Budazhe Xianlu Longduan,” (Airline Companies Colluded 
to Fix Prices), 24 April, http://www.traveldaily.cn/article/30018. Access 20 March 2017; Sina. 2009. “Wuda 
Hangkong Gongsi Beibao Lianshou Zhangjia,”(Five Large Airline Companies Were Revealed to Colluded to 
Fix Prices), 22 April, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2009-04-22/040117659240.shtml. Access 20 March 2017. 
 
14 Zhang, Xingxiang 2015. 
 
15 Ibid. (The original Chinese report is published in issue 4 of Price Supervision and Check in 2010). 
 
16 Ibid.  
 
17 Interview with BJ04, an NDRC official. Phone interview with a Chinese antitrust scholar, Dec. 2013.  
 
18 Zhang, Xingxiang 2015 (noting such coverage of antitrust enforcement was suspended after 2013). 
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concern of “double penalty.”19  He explained that many firms requested that the NDRC not 
publicize its case for fear of the reputational sanction on these firms.20   
 
ii. Proactive Disclosure 
In contrast to the low-key approach that it took in most cases, on three occasions the NDRC 
acted as a whistle blower by strategically leaking information to state media.  As the NDRC 
publicizes the case through highly influential state-media outlet such as the CCTV and the 
People’s Daily, the media coverage exposes the firm to a high level of publicity.   
 
On 9 November 2011, Li Qing 李青, a deputy director general at the antitrust unit of the NDRC, 
announced in the CCTV that her agency had been investigating two large telecommunication 
firms—China Telecom and China Unicom—for antitrust violations.21  Ms Li claimed that the 
two SOEs have a dominant market position and together held over two-thirds of the market 
shares in the internet access market.22  According to her, these two SOEs had conducted price 
discrimination against rival companies—if these facts were ultimately proven true, these two 
firms could be subject to a fine of 1-10% of the fiscal revenue, potentially up to RMB 8 billion 
for these two SOEs. 23  In addition to the antitrust allegations, Ms Li asserted that these two 
SOEs have not achieved full integration, thus increasing the cost of internet access for internet 
service providers. 24  The CCTV program also referred to a recent report prepared by the 
National Telecommunication Expert Committee, noting that China’s internet speed ranks 71st 
in the world, less than one-tenth of the average speed of the OECD countries while costing two 
or three times more. 25   The TV show quoted estimates from the report, noting that the internet 
access price will decrease 27% to 38% in five years if the relevant market becomes truly 
competitive, saving RMB 10 billion to RMB 15 billion for Chinese consumers. 26  The NDRC 
announcement caused a sensation in China and public opinion was overwhelming negative for 
these two SOEs.  A survey conducted by Sina Weibo, the Chinese Twitter, on the day of 
NDRC’s announcement shows that 96% of the participants believed that these two SOEs held 
dominant positions in the broadband market and that 86% of the participants were dissatisfied 
with their performance. 27   
                                                 
19 CCTV 2015. “Fanlongduan Zhenxiang” (The Truth of Antitrust), 16 Feb., 
http://jingji.cntv.cn/2015/02/16/VIDE1424029494651330.shtml. Accessed 21 March 2017. 
 
20 Ibid.  
 
21 CCTV 2011.  
 
22 Ibid.  
 
23 Ibid.  
 
24 Ibid.  
 
25 Ibid.  
 
26 Ibid.  
 
27 Yue, Yuan. 2011.  “Fagaiwei Zhi Dianxin Liantong Shexian Longduan, Ying Weiguan, Gejie Fanying Buyi” 
(NDRC Alleged China Telecom and China Unicom Were Monopolies, Mixed Feedback from Different Sides), 




As later revealed by the Xinhua News, the NDRC’s investigation of these two SOEs was met 
with significant oppositions from various ministries who were concerned about the controversy 
over the matter and urged the NDRC not to reach its conclusion hastily before gathering solid 
evidence. 28   Thus, the NDRC’s announcement on the CCTV not only sent a shock to the SOEs, 
but also to the other government departments who were involved and were consulted before 
the investigation.29  According to the Xinhua news, the surprise announcement on the CCTV 
is a deliberate tactic adopted by the NDRC in response to the arrogant attitude displayed by 
these two SOEs.30  Interviews with NDRC officials corroborate the news report.  Insiders note 
that the NDRC faced significant opposition from bureaucratic departments including the State-
Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), who was concerned 
about the potential loss of state assets, and the Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology (MIIT), who was concerned that NDRC was encroaching its turf.31  By leaking 
the news to the CCTV, the NDRC hoped that public opinion against these two SOEs would in 
turn exert pressures on these two firms, making it more difficult for other bureaucratic 
departments to intervene in the matter. 32 
 
Two years later, the NDRC applied the same tactic again when it investigated a number of 
domestic and foreign infant-formula manufacturers (Infant Formula Case).  On 1 July 2013, 
the CCTV claimed that it had obtained confirmation from the NDRC that the agency had been 
investigating Biostime and a few other infant-formula manufacturers for conducting resale 
price maintenance (RPM) in China.33  Notably, the CCTV only named Biostime but omitted 
the names of the other manufacturers.  The CCTV news specifically highlighted that Biostime 
had a large market share in the premium infant-formula market and had been charging 
abnormally high prices for its products.  The day after the CCTV’s announcement, People’s 
Daily disclosed the names of five more companies who were also involved, claiming that it 
had obtained confirmation from the NDRC.34  Mysteriously, Meiji, Fonterra, and Beingmate, 
who were at that time also being investigated by the NDRC, were not mentioned in the news.  
It therefore appears that within the same case, the NDRC exposed the firms under investigation 
to three different levels of publicity, as shown in Table 2 (below).  
                                                 
28 Xinhua Net 2011.  
 
29 Ibid.  
 
30 Ibid.  
 
31 Interview with BJ 02, BJ04, two NDRC officials. 
 
32 Ibid.  See also Xinhua Net 2011. 
 
33 CCTV. 2013. “Fazhan Gaigewei Dui Heshengyuan Deng Rufen Qiye Fanlongduan Diaocha” (NDRC 
Launched An Antitrust Investigation Into Bostime and Other Milk Powder Companies), 
http://tv.cntv.cn/vodplay/015c07df1972448e915602c6c74c20b2/860010-1102010100. Accessed 21 March 
2017. 
 
34 Zhu, Jianhong. 2013. “Fagaiwei Fanlongduan Ju Zhengzai Diaocha Duojia Naifen Qiye Shexian Jiage 
Longdong,” (NDRC’s Antitrust Bureau Is Launching An Antitrust Investigation Into Milk Powder Companies 
Suspected of Price Monopolies), 2 July, http://finance.people.com.cn/n/2013/0702/c1004-22039996.html 




According to an NDRC official, such differential disclosures have to do with the firms’ level 
of cooperation rather than the severity of their conduct.35  That is, if a firm vigorously defended 
itself and did not quickly admit its guilt, the NDRC would expose the firm to more negative 
publicity and impose a higher penalty on the company.  In this case, Biostime was the most 
difficult to deal with, as the firm fiercely defended its conduct during the investigation.36  This 
contrasted with other firms involved in the investigation—an example that the official gave is 
Meiji, which readily cooperated with the agency and even volunteered to submit all the 
evidence of its resale price maintenance practices to the agency.37   
 
TABLE 2: DISCLOSURE PATTERN OF INVESTIGATION IN MILK POWDER CASE  
 





Grounds for the fine 
Biostime Yes Yes 6% Severe violations, failed to rectify 
its behaviour  
MeadJohnson No Yes 4% Being unco-operative during 
investigation but proactively 
rectified its behaviour 
Abbott  No Yes 3% Cooperative during investigation 
and rectified its behaviour Fonterra  No No 3% 
Dumex No Yes 3% 
Wyeth No Yes 0 Proactively provided important 
evidence and rectified its 
behaviour  
Beingmate No No 0 
Meiji No No 0 
*CCTV: Whether the firm was mentioned in the CCTV programme 
**People’s Daily: Whether the firm was mentioned in People’s Daily 
***Severity of Penalty:  The severity of penalty is measured by the percentage of the revenue used to calculate 
the fines imposed on the individual firms.   
Source: the official penalty decisions by the NDRC and various news articles on these cases on file with the author. 
 
The third case involved a number of gold retailers in Shanghai who allegedly colluded to fix 
prices for gold retailing (Gold Retailer Case) in 2014.  The  People’s Daily, a Party mouthpiece, 
was the first to disclose the investigation, claiming that it had obtained confirmation from the 
NDRC as exclusive coverage.38  Similar to the above two cases, the NDRC appeared to have 
been met with strong resistance during its investigation.  During a TV interview, an NDRC 
official recalled a direct confrontation with the chairman of the trade association, who had 
                                                 




37 Ibid.  
 
38 Wan, Renmin. 2014. “Fagaiwei Diaochu Shanghai Jingjia Chaozhong, She Laofengxiang Yuyuan,” (NDRC 
Is Investigating Price Fixing in Gold Retailing in Shanghai, Laofengxiang and Yuyuan were Involved), 19 July, 
http://finance.people.com.cn/n/2013/0719/c1004-22245568.html.  Accessed 21 March 2017. 
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orchestrated the cartel.39  Notably, some of the gold retailers are partly state-owned and, in fact, 
the Shanghai government used to own all of them.40  A lawyer involved in this case noted that 
some of the gold retailers were initially contemplating filing an administrative appeal against 
the NDRC but ultimately relented due to the pressures from the government. 41 
 
A potential alternative explanation of the NDRC’s high profile announcement in these cases is 
that the agency was seeking to raise the awareness among the Chinese public about antitrust 
compliance.  After all, the AML was only promulgated a few years ago and businesses and 
citizens were only starting to learn about the law.  A closer look at these cases, however, 
suggest that education was unlikely to be the main motivation for the NDRC’s proactive 
disclosure.  First, the NDRC could have achieved the purpose of increasing public awareness 
through the publication of its final decisions, which could have achieved more of a deterrence 
effect, as the case outcome would have been known and the penalty would have been imposed 
at that point.  Moreover, if the primary purpose of such proactive announcement was to educate 
the public, there would have been no need for the agency to expose the firms subject to its 
investigation to different levels of publicity, as shown in the Infant Formula Case.   Furthermore, 
interview findings with the NDRC officials in these cases show that they have tried to leverage 
the public opinion to push forward difficult investigations.   This increases the costs for the 
firms from defying the agency and significantly reduces the NDRC’s cost of prosecution.  
 
Thus far, we have only observed three cases in which the NDRC applied the strategy of 
proactive disclosure.  It is possible that in subsequent investigations, companies became aware 
of the strategic shaming sanction and thus were deterred from challenging the NDRC.  Another 
possibility may have to do with the personal style of the political leader.  Xu Kunlin, who is  
known to use media tactics to push forward difficult cases, left the antitrust bureau in early 
2015.   The new Director General, Zhang Handong 张汉东, is near retirement and is not as 
keen on applying the shaming sanction to compel enforcement.42 
 
II. Impact of Disclosure 
To estimate the effect of the government’s disclosure on the value of a firm, I apply the standard 
event study methodology.43  I particularly focus my analysis on the three investigations in 
which the NDRC proactively announced its investigation.  Despite the limited number of 
observations, these cases set important precedents for subsequent cases.  As the NDRC has 
shown in these early cases that it could also leverage shaming sanctions, firms subject to 
                                                 
39 Yuan, Jin. 2013. “Fagaiwei Tan Fanlongduan Kunjing: You Xiehui Shanglai Jiu Paizhuozi” (NDRC 
Discussed The Difficulties of Antitrust Enforcements: Industry Association Refused to Cooperate), 27 August, 
http://www.nbd.com.cn/articles/2013-08-27/768536.html. Accessed 21 March 2017. 
 
40  Discovery.2013.  “Laofengxiang Deng Jingdian Longduan Jin Jia Huoli Chao 10 Yi, Fagaiwei Jin Fa 1% Yi 
Qian Wan” (Laofengxiang and Other Gold Retailers Monopolized Gold Prices, Reaping Profits Over 1 RMB 
Billion, The NDRC Only Fined 1% RMB 10 Million), http://special.stockstar.com/topic/hj. Accessed 21 March 
2017.  
 
41 Phone interview with a lawyer involved in this case, Oct. 2013.  
 
42 I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this point.  
 
43 Campbell et al. 1996; MacKinlay 1997. 
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investigation would not only need to be concerned about the legal consequences, but also the 
potential adverse market reactions in response to NDRC’s proactive announcement.  Indeed, 
after these three cases, businesses rarely launched a vigorous defense and no firm dared to 
challenge the NDRC in court.  Rather, they quickly surrendered to the NDRC’s request during 
an investigation. A recent example illustrates this:  Between 2014 to 2015, several regional 
offices of the NDRC launched their investigation into the auto industry and conducted dawn 
raids on a number of premium car manufacturers and their dealers in China.  Companies 
including Chrysler, FAW-Volkswagen, BMW, Mercedes-Benz, and Dongfeng-Nissan, as well 
as their dealers, were investigated and received hefty fines for conducting RPM in their sales 
of auto parts.  All the companies involved not only readily admitted their guilt and promised 
to rectify their behavior immediately, but also announced significant price cuts for their auto 
parts even before the agency made its decisions. 44  
 
Admittedly, there could be possible leakage of the NDRC’s investigation before the 
government’s official announcement and this could have an impact on the stock prices of firms 
subject to its investigation.  However, the focus of the inquiry in this article is to examine the 
impact of the NDRC’s strategic use of public shaming sanction, rather than the impact of any 
public disclosure of a firm’s involvement in an antitrust investigation.  This is because the high-
profile announcement on leading party media outlets is an unexpected event, and the gesture 
itself carries valuable information for investors.  As demonstrated in the following analysis 
about the Infant Formula Case, even if a firm has made prior disclosure, investors can still 
glean new information from the regulator’s proactive announcement of its investigations and 
this can also adversely influence the firm’s stock performance.   
 
i. The Market Model 
According to the efficient market hypothesis, the price of the stocks reflects the value of all the 
publicly available information about the company to investors.  Therefore, any news about the 
fundamentals of the company is immediately absorbed and reflected in the share price. To 
examine the market reaction to the government’s announcement of an investigation, it is 
important to estimate the stock price that would have prevailed in the absence of the news at 
the time that the investigation was announced by the NDRC.  The difference between the 
counterfactual return and the actual return represents the abnormal return.   Following existing 
literature on the study of the impact of an antitrust investigation on market value, I use a simple 
market model of returns to calculate a counterfactual return. 
 
The market model is defined as: 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 
 





− 1  
 
and 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖  is the return of the market index at period t. The error term 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is expected to be mean 
zero, and the variance equals to  𝜎𝜎2𝜀𝜀.  𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 and 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 are the closing prices for security i at time 
t and time t-1 respectively. 
                                                 
44 Bloomberg News. 2014. “BMW Cuts Spare-Part Prices in China Amid Antitrust Investigation” 
http://www.autonews.com/article/20140807/GLOBAL03/140809814/bmw-cuts-spare-part-prices-in-china-
amid-antitrust-investigation. Accessed March 21, 2017. 
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The abnormal return can therefore be defined as: 
 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝐸𝐸(𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)   
 
The daily abnormal returns are summarized over the event window to derive the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs): 
 
where CARi(T1-T2) is the cumulative abnormal return for firm i over the event window (T2, T1).  
I examine four event windows: a three-day event window [-1,1], a seven-day event window [-
1,5], an 11-day event window [-5, +5] and a 31-day event window [-20, +10].  The estimation 
window dates from T0 (t = -140) to T1 (t = -21) relative to the announcement date t = 0, 
including 120 trading days.  
   






ii. Stock Reactions 
The previous literature suggests that the negative abnormal returns experienced by firms upon 
the disclosure of an antitrust investigation reflects investors’ prediction of the firm’s value loss 
from three sources:  the estimate of the fines that the company would receive, the loss of profits 
resulting from the price reduction, or other behavioural remedies offered to the regulator, as 
well as reputation sanctions. 45   In the Chinese context, however, a high-profile public 
announcement by an antitrust agency sends another important signal to the market—the firm’s 
loss of political capital.  In China, political connection with the government is a particularly 
important and valuable asset for a firm.46  This is especially the case for SOEs, which have 
close ties with the Chinese government and enjoy convenient channels for lobbying its various 
bureaucratic departments.  
 
As set forth in Table 3 below, in both the China Telecom/China Unicom and the Gold Retailer 
Case, companies experienced significant negative abnormal return either on the day of or the 
day after the NDRC’s announcement.  Notably, China Telecom and China Unicom are two of 
the three largest telecom companies in China and they are both directly owned by the Central 
government. Yu Yuan Tourist Mall and Lao Feng Xiang were both formerly owned by the 
Shanghai Government but the former was privatized, while the latter remained owned by the 
State.  Thus, in addition to the investors’ prediction of the loss of fundamental value of these 
firms, investors may also predict a loss of political capital of these firms.  The NDRC’s 
announcement on the CCTV or the People’s Daily may signal that the SOEs involved in these 
cases have fallen out of political favor, hence they lack the political clout to avoid such 
                                                 
45 Broek, Kemp, Verschoor and De Vries 2012, 234-235. 
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investigation or to stop the disclosure by the agency in the first place.  Indeed, as discussed in 
the previous section, NDRC officials acknowledged that they didn’t disclose some cases due 
to the political pressures that they faced in investigating these firms.   
 
TABLE 3: IMPACT ON STOCK PRICES IN CHINA TELECOM/CHINA UNICOM  
CASE AND GOLD RETAILER CASE 
 











China Telecom -0.02* 0.01 0.02 0.00 





-0.03* -0.02* -0.01 -0.06** 
Lao Feng Xiang -0.01 -0.04* -0.11** -0.07** 
***Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10% 
 
Unlike the above two cases involving domestic SOEs, investigated firms in the Infant Formula 
Case were exposed to three different levels of publicity, as set forth in Table 1 above. This 
allows us to isolate the effects of the disclosure and presents us with a unique opportunity to 
examine and compare the market reactions in these different scenarios.   
 
TABLE 4: IMPACT ON STOCK PRICES IN THE INFANT FORMULA CASE 
 








Infant Formula  Biostime -0.01 -0.12*** -0.37***   -0.22*** 
 Mead Johnson -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.13***   -0.05* 
 Abbott  0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.02 
 Fonterra  -0.01 0.00 0.00  0.00 
 Dumex (Danone) -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 
 Wyeth (Nestlé SA) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
 Beingmate 0.07** 0.05* 0.08   0.11* 
 Meiji 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
 
***Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10% 
Note:  
1. The NDRC announced its investigation of the Infant Formula Case on 1 July 2013, which is a public 
holiday in Hong Kong.  Therefore, T=0 for Biostime is 2 July 2013.   
2. These companies listed in Table 3 are listed in different stock exchanges in Hong Kong, Paris, Shenzhen, 
New York, and Tokyo.  For the purpose of examining their abnormal return, I use the stock price of their 
holding companies. Thus, for the purpose of analyzing the abnormal returns of Dumex and Wyeth, I use 
the stock returns of their holding company, which is Danone and Nestlé.   
 
In the Infant Formula Case, Biostime was subject to most publicity and it clearly felt the 
strongest impact from the NDRC’s announcement.  Although the company had made a prior 
disclosure that it had been subject to antitrust investigation, the NDRC’s subsequent 
announcement still sent a very bad signal to the market.  Biostime’s stock suffered a cumulative 
negative abnormal return of 22% upon the NDRC’s announcement in the three-day event 
window and 37% in the seven-day event window.  Both results are highly statistically 
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significant.  This shows that investors can gain new information from the NDRC’s action, even 
though the government’s announcement itself contains no more information than Biostime’s 
own disclosure.  Because Biostime was the only firm that was named in the CCTV, investors 
may have read this message as a sign that the NDRC had obtained solid evidence of the firm’s 
antitrust violations and that the firm’s infringement was very severe.  Therefore, the loss of 
equity may reflect investors’ predictions of the legal sanctions, including the potentially high 
fine that could be imposed under the AML, as well as behavioural remedies (such as price 
reductions) formally or informally imposed by the NDRC.  Furthermore, the NDRC announced 
the news on a CCTV programme which condemned the excessively high prices of Biostime’s 
products, and in subsequent days Biostime found itself lambasted by a slew of Chinese media 
accusing it of using aggressive distribution tactics to reap abnormal profits.  Investors may 
therefore predict a loss from the reputation sanction—that the overwhelming public criticisms 
targeted at Biostime would result in a loss of trust from consumers and suppliers, thus affecting 
the firm’s sales and future performance.   
 
In addition to Biostime, Mead Johnson, which was mentioned in People’s Daily, also suffered 
a huge loss upon the announcement.  Its stock suffered a cumulative negative abnormal return 
of 5% upon the NDRC announcement in the three-day event window and 13% in the six-day 
event window.  Both results are statistically significant.  However, the stock reactions of Abbott, 
the holding companies of Dumex (i.e. Danone) and Wyeth (i.e. Nestlé), which were also 
mentioned in the same newspaper, are not as strong.  This may have to do with the fact that 
these companies are large multinational conglomerates and the Chinese investigation only 
affected a small part of their global businesses.  Based on the disclosure from the annual reports, 
Abbott’s revenue from China accounted for 5% of its global revenue in 2013, whereas the 
Chinese revenue of Danone and Nestlé only accounted for 7% of their overall revenue during 
that year.  Moreover, milk powder is not a major source of revenue for these firms.  For instance, 
income from whole-milk powder business accounted for only 10% of the total revenue of 
Abbott, 20% of Danone, and 14% of Nestlé in 2013.  This contrasted with Mead Johnson, 
which invested heavily in China and derived almost 31% of its global revenue from the 
mainland market in 2013.47  Lastly, and not surprisingly, for those firms that were omitted in 
the news (i.e., Fonterra, Beingmate, and Meiji), the NDRC’s announcement had little negative 
effect on stock prices.   Notably, after the NDRC’s initial announcement on the CCTV, there 
was much speculation of which infant formula producer was involved. As the focus of the 
inquiry of this article is on the impact of the NDRC’s strategic shaming, the market reactions 
to other types of public disclosures are less relevant here. 
 
To further investigate the impact of differential disclosure on stock prices, I compared the stock 
reactions of Biostime and Beingmate, the two domestic firms that were subject to two extreme 
levels of publicity (one was mentioned in both the CCTV program and the People’s Daily, 
while the other was completely omitted in the news).  The business operations of these two 
firms are highly similar to each other.  Both companies sold exclusively to the mainland 
Chinese market and both derived the vast majority of their revenue from the sales of infant 
formula.  In particular, milk powder accounted for 93% of Beingmate’s revenue in 201348 and 
                                                 
47 Key, Diana. 2016. “Analyzing the Financials of Mead Johnson, A Heavy Hitter in Pediatric Nutrition.” 
http://marketrealist.com/2016/01/analyzing-financials-mead-johnson-heavy-hitter-pediatric-nutrition/. Accessed 
21 March 2017.  
 
48Beingmate. 2014.  “Beiyinmei Yingtong Shipin Gufen Youxian Gongsi 2013 Niandu Baogao” (Annual Report 
2013 of Beingmate), http://www.cninfo.com.cn/finalpage/2014-04-09/63808286.PDF . Accessed 21 March 
2017. 
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82% of the revenue of Biostime in 2013.49  The former is listed on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange and the latter is listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.   Thus, it seems that the 
NDRC’s investigation would affect a significant portion of the businesses of both firms.  Yet 
despite their similar exposure to the NDRC’s investigation, their stocks had completely 
different reactions, as demonstrated in Table 5 below.  
 
TABLE 5: COMPARISON OF ABNORMAL RETURN AND CUMULATIVE 






(July 1 2013) 
AR  
NDRC Decision 
(August 6 2013) 
Biostime Beingmate Biostime Beingmate 
t= -1 -0.09*** 0.00 -0.03 0.00 
t= 0 -0.01 0.07** 0.07** 0.01 
t= 1 -0.12*** 0.05* -0.02 -0.04 
t= 2 -0.19*** 0.10*** -0.02 -0.01 
t= 3 0.03 -0.07** -0.03 0.02 
t= 4 -0.02 -0.05* 0.00 -0.02 





(July 1 2013) 
CAR 
NDRC Decision 
(August 6 2013) 
 Biostime Beingmate Biostime Beingmate 
(-20; +10) -0.28* 0.12 0.22 -0.20 
(-5; +5) -0.41*** 0.11 0.09 -0.05 
(-1; +5) -0.37*** 0.08 -0.05 -0.09 
(-1; +1) -0.22*** 0.11** 0.02 -0.03 
***Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10% 
Note:  Because July 1 2013 is a public holiday in Hong Kong, T=0 is July 2 2013 for Biostime.  
 
On the second trading day after the NDRC’s announcement (T=1), Biostime experienced an 
abnormal return of -12% and a further return of -19% on the third day.  Both results are highly 
statistically significant.  Beingmate, which was also investigated but was omitted in the 
NDRC’s disclosure, had a completely different fortune.  Its stock prices reacted positively to 
the NDRC’s announcement: the abnormal return on the first day of the announcement was 7%, 
followed by 5% and 10% on the second and third trading days.  All these results are statistically 
significant.  This suggests that the market was probably not aware of Beingmate’s involvement 
at that time.  Because Beingmate is a domestic company, the market might have been mistaken 
in thinking that the investigation was solely targeted at foreign firms and thus domestic firms 
could have benefited from the NDRC’s intervention.  Beingmate’s stock prices only started to 
                                                 
 
49Biostime. 2014. “Heshengyuan Guoji Konggu Youxian  Gongsi 2013 Nianbao” (Annual Report 2013 of 
Biostime), http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/SEHK/2014/0402/LTN20140402614_C.opdf . 
Accessed 21 March 2017. 
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tumble on 4 July 2013, when the firm publicly admitted its involvement in the case.50  Indeed, 
Beingmate’s delay in disclosing its involvement prompted some Chinese investors to accuse 
the firm of defrauding investors in violation of the disclosure requirements under Chinese 
securities law.51 
 
On 7 August 2013, the NDRC released its decision and imposed the heaviest sanction on 
Biostime.  Despite this, the market reacted positively to the news and the firm experienced a 
positive abnormal return of 7% on the day of the decision.  This seems to suggest that the 
market had earlier overreacted to the NDRC’s announcement and had probably overestimated 
Biostime’s legal sanctions.  As one executive involved in the Infant Formula Case told the 
newspaper after the NDRC’s announcement of its investigation: “We hope the NDRC will 
release its decision soon.  The sooner it decides, the less impact it will have on our stock 
performance.”52  At the same time, Beingmate experienced a slight positive abnormal return 
of 1% on the day of the NDRC’s decision, followed by a return of -4% on the next day, even 
though the company received full leniency and was not subject to any fine.  This is another 
sign that the market was probably unaware of Beingmate’s involvement in the investigation 
and the negative stock reaction reflects the investors’ expectation of the loss of profits as a 
consequence of the need to reduce prices after the investigation.   
 
To be sure, the NDRC officials sometimes disclosed their investigations during their press 
conferences or interviews. But such types of disclosures occurred after the self-disclosures by 
the investigated firms, and they were not publicized in highly influential media outlets such as 
the CCTV or the People’s Daily. Thus, the NDRC did not intend to employ the strategic 
shaming sanction in those circumstances of passive disclosure.  For completeness, I 
investigated the stock-market reactions of those cases in which the NDRC took a reactive 
approach in disclosing its investigation. As shown in Table 6 below, the market reactions to 
the NDRC’s announcements in these cases are much weaker than those observed in Tables 3 
and 4 above. Because the NDRC did not specify the firm involved or made no disclosure 









TABLE 6: IMPACT ON STOCK PRICES UPON THE NDRC’S REACTIVE PUBLIC 
ANNOUNCEMENT OF INVESTIGATION BY COMPANY AND CASE NAME 
                                                 
50 Hu, Xiaohong. 2013. “Beiyinmei Chenren Zao Fanlongduan Diaocha” (Beingmate Admitted that It Was 
Involved in Antitrust Investigation), 5 July, http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/s/20130705/082816024813.shtml.  
Accessed 21 March 2017. 
 
51 Pang, Qiangying. 2013. “Beiyinmei Shua Xiao Congming Beizhi Xing Pi Wei Gui” (Beingmate Was Accused 
of Violating Securities Disclosure Requirements), 6 July, http://www.ccstock.cn/stock/gongsi/2013-07-
06/A1246410.html.  Accessed 21 March 2017. 
 
52 Bihua, Ye. 2013. “Fagaiwei Shiyi Huishi Mianzao Zhongfa: Shouxian Jiangjia Shuaixian Rencuo,” (NDRC 
Explained Why Wyeth Got Exemptions From Penalties: Wyeth Was The First One To Reduce Price), 8 August, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/gsnews/20130808/022816379184.shtml. Accessed 21 March 2017. 
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InterDigital InterDigital -0.01 0.06 0.08 0.06 
Qualcomm Qualcomm 0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 
Auto Part  FAW Group -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 
 Volkswagen  0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 
 Chrysler 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.02* 
 Mercedes 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.02* 
* Significant at 10% 
Note: The companies listed in Table 6 were listed in different stock exchanges in New York, Shanghai, and 
Frankfurt.  For the purpose of examining their abnormal return, I use the stock price of their holding companies.  
Notably, FAW-Volkswagen is a joint venture between FAW Group and Volkswagen so their stock returns are 
presented separately here.  
 
To further assess the impact of the announcement on a firm’s value, Table 7 presents the loss 
of market capitalization during a three-day event window upon the NDRC’s announcement.  It 
is difficult to evaluate precisely the reputation effects in these cases, but it is clear that the 
ultimate fine imposed on these firms is dwarfed by the value loss that these firms experienced 
upon the regulatory announcement.  To illustrate, Biostime suffered an equity loss of almost 
RMB 4.39 billion upon the NDRC’s announcement during a three-day event window, which 
is 26 times larger than the fines that it ultimately received. 
 
TABLE 7: COMPARISION OF VALUE LOSS WITH FINE DURING THREE-DAY 
EVENT WINDOW UPON THE NDRC’S ANNOUNCEMENT 













-0.06** 572,978,344 5,019,600 114 
Lao Feng 
Xiang 
-0.07** 258,654,584 3,232,900   80 
Infant 
Formula 
Biostime -0.22*** 4,394,704,508 162,900,000 27 
Mead Johnson -0.05* 4,831,315,340 203,760,000 24 
***Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10% 
 
Note:  
1. Market capitalization is calculated as the product of share price and the number of outstanding shares. 
2. The value loss is calculated by multiplying the cumulative abnormal returns over the [-1, +1] event 
window by the market capitalization of the firms on the trading day before the event.   
3. The value losses of Biostime and Mead Johnson have been converted into RMB using the historical 
exchange rate on the event date.  
4. The China Telecom/China Unicom Case was excluded, as the case was ultimately suspended and the 
NDRC did not impose any fine.   
 
As the NDRC possesses significant discretion in deciding whether, when, and how to disclose 
an investigation, it can potentially use this discretion to its advantage. If a publicly listed firm 
does not cede to the agency’s demand, it could face a strategic proactive disclosure by the 
antitrust agency, resulting in a dramatic equity loss.  On the other hand, if a firm readily gives 
in, the agency might not disclose its investigation, might delay announcing its decision, or 
might even conceal its decision, thus minimizing the negative impact on its stock performance.  
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Such a strategic move creates powerful incentives for firms to cooperate with the agency and 
deters them from defending themselves or challenging the agency in public or in court.   
 
Importantly, these early precedents in Chinese antitrust enforcement have become the focal 
point53 for future cases. Lawyers and in-house counsel used them as lessons to “educate” 
clients as to how they should cope with an NDRC investigation and to warn them against the 
consequences of a vigorous defence.54  In subsequent investigations, particularly in those resale 
price maintenance cases, manufacturers proactively offered significant price reductions in 
response to the NDRC’s investigations in order to show willingness to cooperate with the 
agency. 55 While this gesture would have been deemed highly risky in other jurisdictions and, 
indeed, has puzzled foreign antitrust experts,56 it seems to be a rational decision in the Chinese 
context.  Given the significant discretion that the NDRC possesses, a business subject to 
investigation fears not only a potentially higher legal sanction as a consequence of voicing 
defence, but also a significant market loss if the NDRC imposes a public shaming sanction.  As 
such, few foreign multinational firms subject to the NDRC’s investigation dared to challenge 
its decisions in court, despite the many grievances that they have voiced through their chambers 
of commerce.57  
 
III. Conclusion 
This article examines the pattern of disclosure by the NDRC during the first eight years of its 
antitrust enforcement and measures the impact of such disclosures on firms’ stock 
performances through event studies.  It finds that while the NDRC routinely took a passive 
approach in disclosing its investigations, it proactively announced its investigations on state 
media in three high-profile cases during the period of 2011 to 2013.  A common feature of 
these cases is that the NDRC was met with significant opposition during its investigations, and 
the agency tried to leverage public opinion to gain political support and to exert pressures on 
the firms to conform to the agency’s demands.  Event studies show that in these cases, the 
NDRC’s announcements led to negative and statistically significant abnormal returns of the 
stock prices of investigated firms.  Such a severe market sanction earns the NDRC the 
reputation as a tough regulator, deterring firms from defying the agency in future investigations.  
 
The findings in this article further advance our understanding of shame as a regulatory tool in 
the Chinese administrative law system.  In a departure from the previous literature, shaming is 
imposed preemptively and strategically to induce firms to cooperate with the agency.  Thus, 
shaming is not used as an alternative to the formal legal sanction, but rather a regulatory tool 
                                                 
53 Schelling 1990.  
 
54 Interview with BJ06, an in-house legal counsel, Beijing, June 2016.  Interview with BJ07, an antitrust lawyer, 
Beijing, June 2016.  Interview with Lon01, a Chinese antitrust lawyer, London, Feb. 2016. Interview with 
Lon02, a Chinese antitrust lawyer, London, March 2016.   
 
55 Mitchell, Tom. 2014 “China Antitrust Ruling Blunts Foreign Criticisms,” Financial Times. 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/61d3f8aa-28ff-11e4-9d5d-00144feabdc0.html#slide0. Accessed 21 March 2017. 
 
56 Stefan, Andreas. 2013. “Chinese Milk Powder Case: How Do We Interpret A Price Cut Upon An Antitrust 
Announcement”, https://competitionpolicy.wordpress.com/2013/07/16/chinese-milk-powder-case-how-should-
we-interpret-a-price-cut-on-the-announcement-of-an-antitrust-investigation/. Accessed 21 March 2017. 
 
57 US Chamber of Commerce. 2014; European Chamber of Commerce. 2014.  
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at the disposal of the NDRC. 58  Such a novel application of the shaming sanction helps the 
NDRC, a newly established antitrust agency with limited capacity and resources, to push 
forward its hectic enforcement, even on the basis of dubious legal and economic grounds.  
 
Notably, among the three cases in which the NDRC applied the strategic shaming sanction, 
two of them involved domestic SOEs.  These cases demonstrate that the Chinese antitrust 
agencies are incentivized to bring actions against SOEs, despite the strong political resistance 
that they might encounter in tackling those cases.  Indeed, because many SOEs operate in 
regulated sectors, antitrust interventions help the agency expand its policy control in those areas, 
as evident in the China Telecom/China Unicom Case. 59  Meanwhile, Chinese SOEs are often 
sheltered from regulations due to their superior bureaucratic status, and they have relatively 
easy access to the government and convenient channels to lobby against regulation.  However, 
as many large Chinese SOEs have been listed at domestic or overseas stock exchanges, market 
sanction is an important constraint faced by these SOEs when they become subject to antitrust 
investigation.  Public shaming thus becomes an important mechanism for antitrust regulation 
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摘要：本文考察了国家发展和改革委员会（“发展和改革委员会”）在执行反垄断法过
程中采用的一种新型监管策略—战略性的公众羞辱。根据对媒体报道和访谈结果的分
析，作者发现国家发改委披露调查的方式是高度战略性的，取决于公司对调查的合作
态度。事件研究进一步表明，国家发改委的积极披露导致受调查的公司股票价格有显
著异常的负面收益。例如，2013 年受发改委调查的一家婴儿配方奶粉制造商合生元在
三天内股价的累积显著异常的负面收益达到 22％，致使其市值的损失高达反垄断罚金
的 27 倍。这些研究表明国家发改委的战略性的公众羞辱策略可能导致被调查企业受到
严厉的市场制裁，从而阻止了企业抵抗监管者。 
